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INTRODUCTION
President George W. Bush's nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to fill retiring
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's Supreme Court seat unleashed a storm of
speculation about the likely substance of his jurisprudence. That storm intensified
when, following the death of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Roberts was
designated to fill the center seat instead. Although Roberts's rdsumd, including his
experience as a White House counsel and Deputy Solicitor General in two
Republican administrations, clearly marked him as a conservative,' it was generally
agreed that his opinions as a circuit court judge provided few clues to his positions
on the most divisive issues likely to come before the Supreme Court.2 Overlooked,
* Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. Ph.D., J.D., Yale University;
A.B., Bryn Mawr College. I am grateful to Jean Eggen and Philip Ray for their helpful
readings of earlier drafts of this article.
1. Roberts served as Special Assistant to the Attorney General and as Associate
Counsel to the President in President Ronald Reagan's administration and as Principal
Deputy Solicitor General in President George H.W. Bush's administration. Biographies of
Current Members of the Supreme Court, available at www.supremecourtus.gov [hereinafter
Supreme Court Biographies].
2. According to a story that appeared in the Washington Post shortly after his
nomination, "Roberts's short time on the bench, coupled with the relative paucity of his
writings, has left critics and potential supporters with little by which to judge how he will
vote on the Supreme Court." R. Jeffrey Smith & Jo Becker, Record ofAccomplishment-And
Some Contradictions, WASH. POST, July 20, 2005, at Al. A story published the same day in
USA Today made the same point: "Roberts' limited experience as a federal appeals judge-
scarcely two years and about 40 largely noncontroversial opinions-gives few clues to his
legal philosophy." Does Roberts Represent Mainstream Law, Values?, USA TODAY, July 20,
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however, in the speculation about the direction of the nominee's future
jurisprudence was another aspect of his performance on the bench, one on which
his lower court record would have been surprisingly illuminating: Roberts's
judicial personality.
As I have elsewhere used the term,3 a judicial personality is the voice that a
judge crafts from a range of rhetorical choices including-among numerous other
elements-diction, metaphor, syntax, allusion, and tone. In this era of opinion
drafting by multiple law clerks, it is far rarer than it once was for a judge to develop
a distinctive voice that expresses a consistent attitude toward the business of
decision making. Roberts, however, is one of those infrequent exceptions. From his
first opinion on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Roberts
has emerged as a confident stylist who deliberately selects the word, the image, the
tone that will convey not just a legal position but a personal perspective as well.
In his court of appeals opinions, most of them unanimous rulings on relatively
narrow issues of statutory interpretation, Roberts favors informal diction and a
lightly ironic tone that tend to humanize otherwise dry institutional issues. He
engages the reader through a range of strategies, from figurative language to
syntactical asides, suggesting that even the technical subject of administrative law
is rooted in human experience as well as regulatory doctrine. The Supreme Court
docket has provided Roberts with a richer and more varied set of legal problems,
and in his first term he seems at times to be feeling his way toward a voice that
retains some of the conversational qualities of his earlier opinions while
acknowledging the added dignity of the high court. It is principally in his dissents
and concurrences that Roberts has expressed most fully his judicial personality,
countering the majority's abstract theories with his own perspective on law as a
reflection of the realities of human experience.
This Article will analyze Roberts's rhetorical choices, first in his court of
appeals opinions and then in the opinions from his first Supreme Court term. That
analysis reveals the new Chief Justice as a careful and detached stylist who favors
experience over theory in his opinions and who locates himself as the heir to a
distinguished tradition ofjudicial skepticism.
I. SHAPING A JUDICIAL PERSONALITY: ROBERTS AS CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE
When Roberts joined the Supreme Court as its seventeenth Chief Justice on
September 29, 2005, he brought with him slightly more than two years of judicial
experience as a member of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. 4 In that brief tenure, Roberts authored forty-eight opinions: forty-three for
his court, two concurrences, two dissents, and one hybrid-an opinion both
concurring and dissenting in part. Most of those opinions were relatively brief, and
many involved narrow issues of administrative law under specialized statutes. All
but four of Roberts's majority opinions were written for unanimous panels,5 and
2005, at A11.
3. Laura Krugman Ray, Judicial Personality: Rhetoric and Emotion in Supreme Court
Opinions, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 193 (2002).
4. Roberts received his commission for his circuit court seat on June 2, 2003. He took
his seat on the Supreme Court two years and almost four months later. Biographical
Directory of Federal Judges, available at http://www. fc.gov.
5. Brady v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 416 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
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one of his two dissents was a brief rejection of the majority's denial of a rehearing
en banc. 6 His judicial record thus provided little ideological sustenance for either
his supporters or his detractors as they prepared for his confirmation hearing, and
Roberts subsequently faced few questions about the substance of his appellate
jurisprudence.
Despite this seemingly unpromising paper trail, Roberts's circuit court opinions
do provide some intriguing clues to his approach to the business of writing
appellate opinions. In fact, the absence of strong ideological content, reflected in
Roberts's almost invariable agreement with his judicial colleagues, illuminates his
craftsmanship. These are, in many instances, opinions rejecting litigants' arguments
for further review that are more hopeful than compelling. In each case, however,
Roberts provides clear, detailed, and orderly responses to those arguments, giving
each petitioner his full-and fully informed-attention. This may reflect Roberts's
experience of seventeen years as a Washington appellate attorney who himself
argued thirty-nine cases before the Supreme Court.7 He knows what counsel and
client want to see from the court reviewing their claims, even if they have only
limited expectations of success, and he seems to regard it as part of his judicial duty
to take all arguments seriously, if only in the moment before he rejects them, and to
provide an explanation accessible to attorneys and often to lay persons as well.
Read together, Roberts's circuit court opinions hint at the emergence of a
judicial personality, a recognizable voice that consistently expresses a distinctive
attitude. Although these early opinions lack the heft to establish definitively the
elements of Roberts's jurisprudence, they do contain stylistic tendencies that point
the way toward the future evolution of an identifiable voice that "draw[s] on
,,8emotion and experience, as well as intellect, in shaping ... judicial responses. As
a stylist, Roberts already seems intent on finding ways to leaven his utilitarian
prose with personalized elements of diction, metaphor, allusion, syntax, and tone. It
is these elements that convey to the reader a particular judicial persona, someone
whose legal conclusions are informed not only by his mastery of the law but also
by his reading, his interest in the expressive capacity of language, and his
perceptions of human behavior.
A. The Right Word
Explaining his skepticism toward the majority's use of the canons of statutory
interpretation, Roberts announced in one of his few concurrences that "at the end of
(Williams, J., concurring); Taucher v. Brown-Hruska, 396 F.3d 1168, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(Edwards, J., dissenting); United States v. Mellen, 393 F.3d 175, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(Henderson, J., dissenting in part); U.S. ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488,
502 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Garland J., dissenting).
6. Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
7. According to the Supreme Court Web site's biographical summary, Roberts was in
private practice from 1986 to 1989 and again from 1993 to 2003. During the interval from
1989 to 1993, he served as Principal Deputy Solicitor General. Supreme Court Biographies,
supra note 1. As a practitioner, he argued thirty-nine cases before the Supreme Court. Adam
Liptak, Court in Transition: The Record; A Career Largely on One Side of the Bench and
Involving a Wide Variety of Issues, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2005, at A17.
8. Ray, supra note 3, at 195.
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the day I find greater solace in the words themselves."9 His choice of diction makes
clear that he is drawn to "words themselves" for more than solace.10 From his
earliest opinions, Roberts has shown an affinity for the motjuste, the single word
that will sharpen a sentence by identifying precisely how someone has acted or
what is at stake, often in surprising ways. His use of adverbs is illustrative. A
challenge to the court's jurisdiction need only be "meekly noted" in order to be
taken seriously." A relevant precedent "establishes (unremarkably)" a litigant's
right to appeal on an issue. 12 Congress would have acted "quite elliptically" if the
appellants' strained reading of its intent were accurate.' 3 And a car theft victim
might remain "blissfully unaware" of his loss until the next morning.'
4
As a deliberate stylist, Roberts appreciates the power of adjectives to both
illuminate and conceal. Comparing district court and magistrate judge opinions in
the same case, he finds that "[t]he former's opinion lacks the adjectives that
populate the latter's," and thus the first judge acknowledges the difficulty of the
issue at hand while the second attempts to evade it.' 5 In his own choice of
adjectives, Roberts likes to use an unexpectedly literary modifier-sometimes in
contrast to less elevated diction-to underscore a point. Thus, a litigant claims that
it made "herculean efforts" but nonetheless "could not come up with the goods" in
time. 16 The Supreme Court "observed, with blithe understatement," that
"'[c]ompetition among utilities was not prevalent."" 17 There is an "exquisite variety
of academic institutions across the country," requiring the National Labor Relations
Board to develop a substantial body of case law applying a single Supreme Court
precedent.' 8 And, choosing to concur rather than join the majority's unnecessarily
broad holding, he "cannot go along for that gratuitous ride."'19 Such usages, planted
in the middle of otherwise conventional legal prose, have the effect of expanding
the reader's perspective on the case. The "gratuitous ride," for example, plays off
9. Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring
in part and in the judgment).
10. According to those who have worked with him, Roberts's interest in language
manifests itself in several ways. As a White House attorney, he apparently chose to answer a
routine letter because, he wrote to his superior, "'[a]nyone who can quote inspiring passages
from Plato and Webster, however, and use a word like "slumgullion," deserves a reply."'
Anne E. Komblut, In Re Grammar, Roberts's Stance is Crystal Clear, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29,
2005, at Al. Sources describe Roberts as both a dedicated grammarian and a lover of the
unusual word: "A cheerfully ruthless copy editor over the years, Judge Roberts has
demanded verbal rigor from his colleagues and subordinates, refusing to tolerate the slightest
grammatical slip, and boasting an exceptional vocabulary and command of literature
himself." Id.
11. Consumer Elecs. Ass'n v. FCC, 347 F.3d 291, 296 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
12. United States v. Stanfield, 360 F.3d 1346, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
13. U.S. ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488,496 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
14. United States v. Jackson, 415 F.3d 88, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
15. Taucher v. Brown-Hruska, 396 F.3d 1168, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
16. BDPCS, Inc. v. FCC, 351 F.3d 1177, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
17. Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 373 F.3d
1361, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 5 (2002)).
18. Lemoyne-Owen Coll. v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
19. PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
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the Latin root of the adjective ("gratuit," meaning free) to suggest a dual meaning:
the majority's broad holding is not only "assumed without any good ground or
reason" but also, in the primary definition, "[f]reely bestowed or obtained," the
proverbial free ride that allows the court to take advantage of this case to make an
unearned point.2°
B. The Right Comparison
"Gratuitous ride" is also a figurative use of language, in this instance a metaphor
masked by the rejection of the usual adjective "free" in favor of the more formal
"gratuitous." That deliberate change suggests what Roberts's other opinions
confirm: his serious interest in the possibilities of figurative language as a stylistic
tool. Many of his metaphors are drawn from common usage and add a comfortably
familiar note to his legal prose. In his first published circuit court opinion, Roberts
produced his first judicial metaphor, his observation that "diligence . . . should
begin as soon as the ball is in the FAA's court.",21 In other opinions, the reader finds
"jurisdictional speed bumps," 22 "a rhetorical sleight of hand,, 23 "an obvious end-
run around" a rule,24 and "the backbone of software programs." 25 Roberts is also
fond of invoking homely adages to clarify or emphasize a complicated point. Thus,
the FCC is "not crying wolf' in anticipating a technical problem;26 it is a
"fundamental precept of Anglo-American jurisprudence that you cannot have your
cake and eat it, too" by suing an individual government official and simultaneously
treating him as a nation state;27 a jurisdictional requirement must be upheld
"because it is easy enough to spin out 'for want of a nail' scenarios from any set of
facts that could eventually lead to this court";28 and, in a highly technical case
dealing with the sale of power transmissions, "OPG thus would be cutting off its
nose to spite its face by congesting an intertie out of Ontario., 2 9 Occasionally,
Roberts explicates an adage to sharpen his focus. Rejecting the argument of a fired
government employee that he is protected by a whistle-blower statute, Roberts
makes extended use of a common expression to explain the flaw in the appellant's
position:
This reasoning fails to take into account the cumulative effect of Koszola's
misconduct. The adage about the straw breaking the camel's back is familiar
20. 6 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 779 (2d ed. 1989). I am indebted for this
reading of "gratuitous" to Philip Ray.
21. Ramaprakash v. FAA, 346 F.3d 1121, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
22. Midwest ISO, 373 F.3d at 1368.
23. U.S. ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488,493 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
24. AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 394 F.3d 933, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
25. Taucher v. Brown-Hruska, 396 F.3d 1168, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
26. Consumer Elecs. Ass'n v. FCC, 347 F.3d 291, 300 (D.C.Cir. 2003).
27. I.T. Consultants, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Pak., 351 F.3d. 1184, 1191 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
28. In re Tennant, 359 F.3d 523, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
29. Consumers Energy Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 367 F.3d 915, 925
(D.C. Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Mellen, 393 F.3d 175, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(rejecting "the dissent's contrary 'in for a penny, in for a pound' approach").
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because of the truth it conveys. Koszola was fired not simply because of the
misreporting episode, which in any event was no mere straw. That episode was
simply the latest in an accumulation of incidents that exhausted the patience of
Koszola's supervisors and left them with no confidence in him.
30
The visual image of a supervisory camel increasingly burdened by the employee's
transgressions until it collapses under the weight of misconduct renders the
appellant's position both untenable and absurd.
Roberts does on occasion go beyond the familiar in his use of figurative
language. He twice employs a submerged religious metaphor to suggest the
majority's skeptical but open-minded avoidance of an unnecessary issue. Thus, he
insists that "we can remain agnostic on the question whether Congress intentionally
left the presentment requirement in Section 3729(a)(1) or simply forgot to take it
out. '31 Speaking again in the first person, he sidesteps another unresolved issue:
"We persist in our agnosticism on the appropriate standard of review in this case"
because the parties failed to brief and argue the point.32 Roberts can also take
pleasure in the perfect aptness of a particular metaphor, as when he describes the
San Juan Basin as "a prolific source of natural gas, connected by pipeline to
southern California and literally helping to fuel the dramatic growth of that
region. 33 That pleasure in metaphoric possibilities can lead Roberts astray, as
when he mixes knitting and botanical images in a single sentence: "The district
court did not unravel 'a highly integrated' complex of interlocking illegal
provisions ... but rather removed a punitive damages bar that appears to have been
grafted onto an intact and functioning framework .... ",3 Most often, however, he
is adept at finding and developing his own metaphors. When, writing in
concurrence, he wants to pursue one but not all of the implications of the majority's
holding, he introduces his analysis with an amusingly apt image: "Not to chase
down every rabbit spooked by the majority's alternative holding.. .. "35
The recurrence of figurative language suggests something more than Roberts's
literary taste. It also suggests that he tends to think and write in analogical terms
when confronting a complex case. The clearest example of this tendency appears in
30. Koszola v. FDIC, 393 F.3d 1294, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
31. U.S. ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488,496 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
32. United States v. Toms, 396 F.3d 427, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
33. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Watson, 410 F.3d 722, 724 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
34. Booker v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In another mixed
metaphor, Roberts shifts from "a logjam . . . blocking the development of DTV" to
"evidence of this diagnosis." Consumer Elecs. Ass'n v. FCC, 347 F.3d 291, 300 (D.C. Cir.
2003). Roberts is, however, perfectly capable of extending a metaphor without mixing it.
Faced with the issue of the severability of an arbitration agreement provision, he observes
that "[i]f illegality pervades the arbitration agreement such that only a disintegrated fragment
would remain after hacking away the unenforceable parts, . . . the judicial effort begins to
look more like rewriting the contract than fulfilling the intent of the parties." Booker, 413
F.3d at 84-85. See also Bloch v. Powell, 348 F.3d 1060, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("Bloch's
argument runs headlong, however, into a line of precedent."); United States v. Stanfield, 360
F.3d 1345,1353 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("[W]e need more solid footing before deciding where we
stand.").
35. PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 803 n.3 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
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Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, a
case dealing with the complicated rules governing access to power transmission
facilities. Twice in his majority opinion Roberts resorts to analogies to untangle the
issues before the court. The first analogy briskly disposes of FERC's argument that
the petitioners lacked standing because they failed to show that they could not
eventually recoup their challenged losses. Roberts once more finds a domestic
comparison to underscore the weakness of FERC's position: "FERC's argument is
tantamount to contending that a homeowner whose house is destroyed by arson has
not been injured by the arsonist, if the house was adequately insured., 36 Having
found standing, Roberts goes on to reject one of the petitioners' arguments-that
they should not have to pay the costs of an administrative system that they are not
using-by an extended analogy demonstrating that they nonetheless benefit from
the existence of the system:
In this sense, MISO is somewhat like the federal court system. It costs a
considerable amount to set up and maintain a court system, and these costs-
the costs of having a court system-are borne by the taxpayers, even though the
vast majority of them will have no contact with that system (will not use that
system) in any given year. The public nevertheless benefits from having a
system for the prompt adjudication of criminal offenses and the orderly
resolution of civil disputes. Litigants bear some of the costs of using this system
through the payment of filing fees and court costs. They, like utilities
transmitting power under the MISO open access tariff who pay according to
Schedule 1, are paying for the specific benefit of using the court system. The
MISO Owners' position is tantamount to saying that if they are not a litigant,
they should not be made to pay for any of the costs of having a court system.
Since the MISO Owners do, in fact, draw benefits from being a part of the
MISO regional transmission system, FERC correctly determined that they
should share the cost of having an ISO.
37
The comparison is of particular relevance to those involved in the government
regulatory process, but it also has a commonsensical quality that makes it
accessible to outsiders as well.38 Roberts's characteristic use of italics to emphasize
the key elements of his analogy-the difference between having and using a
system-seems specifically designed to reach lay readers as well as those well
versed in administrative processes. Although the opinion of necessity uses a great
deal of technical jargon in resolving the case, this passage suggests what his other
36. Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 373 F.3d
1361, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
37. Id. at 1371 (emphasis in original).
38. In a case dealing with the National Transportation Safety Board's random drug
testing policy, Roberts used another analogy for a structure of legal rules: a sport such as
golf can have a system of rules grounded on the assumption
that participants will in good faith call penalties on themselves, but such an
approach seems ill-advised when it comes to designing regulations to protect
the public from drug use by those in safety-sensitive positions-and in fact that
is not the approach reflected in these regulations.
Duchek v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 364 F.3d 311, 316 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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opinions illustrate: that Roberts prizes a clear and simple explanation even when
the subject matter at issue is dense and technical.
Roberts employs his metaphors and analogies for two related purposes.
Rhetorically, these devices invoke a familiarly rational world in which the losing
litigant's argument, however artfully disguised in abstruse legal terminology,
simply makes no sense. Furthermore, the familiarity of the comparisons makes the
opinion accessible to attorneys and lay readers-including the losing litigant-
alike. For Roberts, clarity seems important not just as a matter of judicial
craftsmanship but as a matter of communication as well. By his choice of imagery,
he suggests that the audience for judicial opinions should include not only
professionals but also the broader universe of people who may, like the MISO
petitioners, someday need to use and understand the legal system.
C. The Colloquial Voice
Roberts's interest in the communicative aspect of his opinions emerges even
more distinctly in his use of diction and syntax to strike an occasionally colloquial
tone. Embedded throughout his opinions, majority as well as concurring and
dissenting, are informal words and structures that speak directly to his audience. In
this respect Roberts's prose is similar to that of Justice Scalia, though in a much
less aggressive and confrontational manner. Where Scalia grabs his readers by the
lapels to give them an earful on the absurdities of the opposing side's position,
Roberts converses equably with his readers, pointing out to them the bases for the
logical conclusions that a calm and fair-minded judge has reached. Where Scalia
rhetorically engages in "indignant conversation," 39 Roberts prefers an explanatory
chat which is designed to win the listeners' confidence rather than elicit their angry
agreement.
Like his metaphors and analogies, Roberts's colloquial voice speaks directly to
nonlawyers. At his confirmation hearing, the nominee made clear his belief that
Supreme Court opinions should be broadly accessible: "I hope we haven't gotten to
the point where the Supreme Court's opinions are so abstruse that the educated lay
person can't pick them up and read them and understand them. You shouldn't have
to be a lawyer to understand what the Supreme Court opinions mean." 40 Roberts's
position differs somewhat from that of Justice Black, who believed that "[w]riting
in language that people cannot understand is one of the judicial sins of our times.''4
39. Ray, supra note 3, at 226. See also id. at 226-29 (discussing Scalia's rhetorical
strategy).
40. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice
of the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005)
(statement of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearing]. Roberts
singled out the opinions of Justice Jackson, whom he described as "one of the best writers
the court has ever had," as admirable in this respect:
They are not written in jargon or legalese, but an educated person whose life,
after all, is being affected by these decisions can pick them up and read them,
and you don't have to hire a lawyer to tell you what it means. I hope we haven't
gotten to a point where that is an unattainable ideal.
Id.
41. ROGER K. NEWMAN, HuGo BLACK: A BIoGRAPHY 325 (2d Ed. 1997). See Ray, supra
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According to his biographer, Roger Newman, "Black wanted litigants, people in
barber shops, 'your momma,' he once told a clerk, to understand his opinions.
' 42
Roberts, in contrast, seeks only to be accessible to "the educated lay person," a
reader presumably capable of appreciating his more sophisticated stylistic elements
as well as his colloquial diction.
As part of his rhetorical strategy for reaching his target audience, Roberts uses
informal locutions seldom found in legal prose. The operator of a helicopter service
had to decide "when to spring the drug test" required by law on his employees
43
and "was somewhat in a bind" because he was himself subject to the test.44 In a qui
tam action under the False Claims Act, "the Government and the relator divvy up"
statutory damages. 45 The federal government "finally caught on to" an employee's
elaborate fraud scheme, 46 and her husband could not claim perfect ignorance
because "[i]t would not take a rocket scientist to deduce that the electronic
equipment Luther was himself using was stolen.' '47 In a challenge to FERC's order
permitting expansion of a marina, "[i]t was obvious from the get-go" that the plan
contained no limits on development.48 Roberts also uses informal diction of another
kind, the interjection "whatever," more common in speech than in prose, to round
off a list and indicate that no variant can change the legal outcome. Thus,
petitioners "readily concede that all transmission customers-bundled, unbundled,
grandfathered, whatever-benefit from" regulation of the grid.49 In another case,
even issues that are "identical, intertwined, closely related, whatever" cannot
provide the basis for a stay.50 The deliberate imprecision of "whatever," usually
avoided in judicial opinions, here strikes another commonsensical note, indicating
the futility of any more inventive alternatives.
Roberts employs one additional strategy of engagement, addressing questions,
instructions, and observations directly to the reader. When he admits that an EPA
letter is, as petitioner claims, "a statement of 'general or particular applicability,"'
he follows up that concession with a rhetorical question--"what isn't?"-before
concluding that the point is irrelevant. 51 Concurring in part, he restates a section of
the majority's opinion and accepts its accuracy-"Fair enough."52-before going
on to identify his point of disagreement. In a stop and frisk case, he asks the reader
to "[r]ecollect what Officer Phillip knew as he began to frisk Holmes, ' 53 and in a
case involving a search of a suspected stolen car he asks "Why the trunk?" before
note 3, at 198-201 (discussing Black's rhetorical strategies to make his opinions
understandable to a broad lay readership).
42. NEWMAN, supra note 41, at 325.
43. Duchek, 364 F.3d at 312.
44. Id. at313.
45. U.S. ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488 at 496 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
46. United States v. Mellen, 393 F.3d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
47. Id. at 181.
48. Brady v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 416 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
49. Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 373 F.3d
1361, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
50. DSMC Inc. v. Convera Corp., 349 F.3d 679, 684 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
51. Indep. Equip. Dealers Ass'n v. EPA, 372 F.3d 420,428 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
52. PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 800 (D.C. Cir.
2004).
53. United States v. Holmes, 385 F.3d 786, 790 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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answering his own question ("[T]he trunk is certainly a convenient place to stash
the real tags once they have been removed from the back of the vehicle."). 54
Sympathizing with the patient reader after a long analysis of the appealability of a
judgment, he announces that "we turn (at last) to the merits of Outlaw's appeal." 55
Such moments involve the reader in the opinion's argument, anticipating concerns
and meeting them as part of the process of persuasive argument.
Perhaps the most informal and engaging moment in Roberts's opinions appears
in a dissent, where he exercises the greatest latitude in writing style. The defendant,
convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, challenged on appeal the
police officers' decision to arrest him without further investigating his claim that
the car he was driving-in which the firearm was found-was in fact borrowed
from his girlfriend. Roberts chooses to reject that challenge by invoking an excuse
that has attained legendary status in American popular culture: "Sometimes a car
being driven by an unlicensed driver, with no registration and stolen tags, really
does belong to the driver's friend, and sometimes dogs do eat homework, but in
neither case is it reasonable to insist on checking out the story before taking other
appropriate action., 56 It would presumably have been possible to identify
precedents in which police officers faced with similar claims also prevailed on
appeal. Roberts's decision to invoke instead the most celebrated childhood excuse
once again roots his jurisprudential style in the shared universe of legal doctrine
and human experience. Judges, he implies, ground their decision making in the
same reality that teachers and parents do, and their conclusions are not confined to
a realm of rarefied abstractions.
D. Repetition and Balance
Although such use of domestic metaphors and informal diction may seem like
the artless choices of a relatively unsophisticated writer, in Roberts's case that
assumption is proven inaccurate by several of his other stylistic choices. He
displays his ear for language in his penchant for the occasional alliterative phrase:
"subpoena spat,"5 7 "crabbed construction,"58 "careful caveat,"59 and-most
exuberantly--"reticulated remedial regime., 60 He also likes the sound of deliberate
repetition as a means of emphasis, as when he resolves a jurisdictional claim by
concluding that "as a constitutional matter, there is no constitutional matter.",6' The
same device recurs, sometimes in shorter form (when he refers to a model "for
54. United States v. Jackson, 415 F.3d 88, 102 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
55. Outlaw v. Airtech Air Conditioning and Heating, Inc., 412 F.3d 156, 163 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
56. Jackson, 415 F.3d at 105 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
57. Koszola v. FDIC, 393 F.3d 1294, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
58. PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 801 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
59. Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring
in part and in the judgment).
60. Fornaro v. James, 416 F.3d 63, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
61. I.T. Consultants, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Pak., 351 F.3d. 1184, 1191 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
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determining when some skew becomes too much skew" 62), and sometimes at
greater length (when he observes that "an officer cruising the streets cannot readily
identify a particular Mercury Marquis as the stolen Mercury Marquis" 63). Roberts's
most elaborate use of repetition comes when he dismisses a district court opinion
that relied on two concurrences: "Well reasoned, to be sure, and perhaps ultimately
persuasive, but-to paraphrase the Supreme Court's dismissal of nonmajority
views in another case-the comments in the concurring opinions are just that:
comments in concurring opinions." 64 The case paraphrased is United States
Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz,65 with a majority opinion written by then
Associate Justice Rehnquist, for whom Roberts was clerking at the time.66 Fritz
was argued on October 6, 1980, at the very beginning of Roberts's clerkship year,
and it might even have been the first case assigned to him by Rehnquist, whose
clerks prepared first drafts of his assigned cases.67 If so, we might be seeing a rare
phenomenon: a circuit court judge citing a Supreme Court opinion drafted almost a
quarter century earlier by himself
Whether Fritz is a precursor of Roberts's later style or a mentor's model, it
reflects his penchant for carefully shaped sentences that aim at balance by repeating
or pairing words or concepts. Thus, he finds "good sense" in the court's "reopening
doctrine" for administrative regulations: "Just as it would be folly to allow parties
to challenge a regulation anew each year upon the annual re-publication of the
Code of Federal Regulations, so too it is silly to permit parties to challenge an
established regulatory interpretation each time it is repeated. 68 The paired terms,
"folly" and "silly," also echo one another, further reinforcing the parallel. Roberts
makes clear his awareness of the shape of his opinions when, in two instances, he
claims a circular structure as well as a victory over the dissent. In the first, he
compares his opinion for the court with his misguided colleague's effort: "The
dissent literally begins and ends with legislative history .... [W]e will end as we
began, too, but with the statutory language." 69 In the second instance, he opens his
concurrence with an elegantly varied repetition worthy of Justice Jackson by citing
"the cardinal principle of judicial restraint-if it is not necessary to decide more, it
is necessary not to decide more, 70 a formulation he liked well enough to use again
62. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of the Commonwealth of Ky. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 397 F.3d 1004, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
63. United States v. Jackson, 415 F.3d 88, 101 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
(emphasis in original).
64. Taucher v. Brown-Hruska, 396 F.3d 1168, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
65. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
66. Rehnquist was referring to the dissenting opinions cited by Justice Brennan in his
own dissent from the Court's announced rational basis standard for equal protection review.
Id. at 177 n.10.
67. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 260 (rev. ed. 2001).
68. Indep. Equip. Dealers Ass'n v. EPA, 372 F.3d 420,428 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
69. U.S. ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 502 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
70. PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). Jackson's prose was
characterized by the use of repetition in the form of inversions; the best known is his
observation about the Supreme Court that "[w]e are not final because we are infallible, but
we are infallible only because we are final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953)
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in his commencement address to students at Georgetown University. 71 Roberts then
concludes with an emphasis on the inevitable shape of his opinion: "I end where I
began-with regret that the majority feels compelled to address far-reaching
questions on which we disagree, when they are wholly unnecessary to the
disposition of the case."
72
E. Allusions and Role Models
These carefully shaped sentences are not the only reflection of Roberts's literary
sensibility. His brief body of opinions contains only a handful of direct literary
allusions, but that handful is sufficient to suggest the range of his reading. In an
early opinion, he endorses the FCC's denial of a waiver with a bilingual flourish:
"Enforcement of the default penalty rule was appropriate, to borrow from Voltaire,
'pour encourager les autres. ,,73 No specific work is cited, and no translation is
provided.74 Instead, the reference suggests that his readers are either familiar with
the quotation or sufficiently conversant with French to translate for themselves, a
reasonable assumption in light of the passage's cognates. Roberts has no difficulty
turning from a rationalist to a transcendentalist source when it serves his purpose.
Chastising a lower court for ignoring cases in which it had decided a similar issue
differently, Roberts cites Emerson to explain the court's remand for clarification:
"Emerson's advice to preachers-'emphasize your choice by utter ignoring of all
that you reject,' RALPH WALDO EMERSON, The Preacher, reprinted in 10
LECTURES AND BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES 215, 235 (1904)-will not do for
administrative agencies., 75 This time, however, the source is part of the problem,
not part of the solution, and Roberts's inclusion of the title of Emerson's work-
The Preacher-in the text obliquely underscores the difference between legal and
inspirational rhetoric.
(Jackson, J., concurring). For a discussion of Jackson's prose style, including his use of
inversions, see Ray, supra note 3, at 208-11.
71. Chief Justice Says His Goal is More Consensus on Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 22,
2006, at A16. The passage in the speech varied slightly from the original version in the
opinion: "If it is not necessary to decide more to a case, then in my view it is necessary not
to decide more to a case." Id.
72. PDK Labs. Inc., 362 F.3d at 809 (Roberts, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment).
73. BDPCS, Inc. v. FCC, 351 F.3d 1177, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original).
74. The passage is from Voltaire's Candide, and its original use suggests that Roberts
has deliberately omitted the citation. When the traveler Candide sees a man executed on the
deck of a warship and asks for an explanation, he learns that the victim is an admiral who
failed to draw close enough to engage a French admiral's ship in combat:
"But," said Candide, "the French admiral was just as far from the English
Admiral as the English Admiral was from him!" "Of course," someone said.
"But in this country it's a good thing to kill an admiral, from time to time, to
spur on the others."
VOLTAIRE, CAuDmE OR OPTIMISM 95 (Burton Raffel trans., 2005). Roberts's shortened
version of Voltaire's joke suggests that the FCC's denial of the penalty waiver will similarly
encourage greater compliance without referring to the steep price paid for that
encouragement in the original text.
75. Lemoyne-Owen Coll. v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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Even when Roberts employs a familiar literary source, he tends to give the
allusion a surprising spin. Dickens' Bleak House is often invoked for the novel's
depiction of an endless and destructive estate matter, and Roberts makes a similar
reference in resolving a probate case: "The roots of this real-life Bleak House saga
doubtless stretch further back in time, but the precipitating event was the death of
Lew Gin Gee Jung (Mother Jung) in January 1995. "76 A page later, after describing
the family dispute and the probate court's decision, he updates the novel in a
footnote: "Even Dickens would have been impressed by the modem twist in this
chapter of the Jung family's Bleak House: the Probate Division ordered the
exhumation of Mother Jung's body for DNA testing to settle the heirship
dispute. 7 7 Roberts uses another classic work, this time The Odyssey, as a foil for
an opinion's outcome. Reviewing the appellant's conspiracy conviction for
involvement in his wife's theft of government property, Roberts distinguishes
between Homer's celebration of marriage and the more skeptical attitude of the
law:
Homer thought there was "nothing greater and better than this-when a
husband and wife keep a household in oneness of mind," THE ODYSSEY, bk. VI,
L 180, but there is no evidence that the drafters of the Sentencing Guidelines
assumed such an ideal could substitute for proof of an agreement to participate
in a conspiracy.78
The Homeric ideal is rejected in favor of a close reading of the record, which shows
no consultation of husband and wife. Roberts concludes with a simple statement of
the marital situation in this case: "The fact that he knew what she was doing does
not mean he agreed to it."
7 9
Even Roberts's less complicated literary references contain some surprises. He
invokes Macbeth not in the context of a criminal appeal but instead in a challenge
by film studios to the denial of royalties by the Copyright Office. Upholding the
regulatory requirement of a postmark to establish timeliness, he explains that "[t]he
express exclusion of the sort of evidence most likely to be submitted in lieu of a
receipt-far from opening the door to other evidentiary submissions-was simply a
way to 'make assurance doubly sure.' WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 4, sc.
1." o Granting a petition for review of an FCC order concerning resales of
telephone service, Roberts quotes from George Eliot's celebrated novel as he
rejects the Commission's proposed analogy as unpersuasive:
George Eliot has written that "the world is full of hopeful analogies,"
MIDDLEMARCH 83 (Penguin Classics 1994) (1872), and this must be one of
them, but likening the transfer at issue to a different arrangement, and then
analyzing how that arrangement would fare under Section 2.1.8, does not
advance the FCC's position very far. 1
76. Jung v. Mundy, Holt & Mance P.C., 372 F.3d 429, 430 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
77. Id. at431 n.1.
78. United States v. Mellen, 393 F.3d 175, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
79. Id.
80. Universal City Studios LLP v. Peters, 402 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
81. AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 394 F.3d 933, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original).
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The quotation is apt, but a reader may be forgiven for wondering if its appearance
reflects as well a fondness for a novel never before or since cited in any federal
court opinion. 82 A common thread in many of these literary allusions is the negative
use of the source to illustrate the wrong way to address the issue at hand. The right
way turns out to be simple, commonsensical, and rooted in the particularities of the
case rather than in complicated idealized approaches. Roberts presents Eliot's
"hopeful analogies," with their appealing optimism, only to reject them in favor of
the realities before the court.
There is a second set of allusions in Roberts's opinions that sheds even more
light on his sense of himself as an appellate judge-allusions to the writings of
other judges. It is surely no coincidence that the first words of his first judicial
opinion were "Learned Hand,, 83 widely considered to be among the greatest
American judges and probably the greatest of those judges never to sit on the
Supreme Court.84 The case, Ramaprakash v. Federal Aviation Administration, was
a routine challenge to a National Transportation Safety Board order on the grounds
of inconsistency, but Roberts's first appellate sentence was scarcely routine:
Learned Hand once remarked that agencies tend to "fall into grooves,...
and when they get into grooves, then God save you to get them out." Judge
Hand never met the National Transportation Safety Board. In this case, we
grant the petition for review because the Board has failed adequately to explain
its departures from its own precedent in no fewer than three significant
respects.
85
82. Perhaps the least surprising of Roberts's literary allusions appears in a quotation
from a Supreme Court opinion, Harrison v. PPG Industries, rejecting an argument based on
the absence of legislative history: "In ascertaining the meaning of a statute," the Court stated,
"a court cannot, in the manner of Sherlock Holmes, pursue the theory of the dog that did not
bark." 446 U.S. 578, 592 (1980). The reference by Justice Stewart is to Arthur Conan
Doyle's short story, The Silver Blaze, in which Holmes deduces from the dog's failure to
bark that the culprit in the theft of a valuable horse was known to the dog and was in fact the
horse's trainer. ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK
HOLMES 3, 27 (Christopher Roden ed.,1993). Harrison was decided in May 1980, shortly
before Roberts began his clerkship with Rehnquist, who also alluded to the story in his
Harrison dissent. 446 U.S. at 596 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As a former Rehnquist clerk as
well as a reader of Supreme Court opinions, Roberts would have had reason to be familiar
with the allusion and its usefulness in debates over statutory interpretation. See also Acree v.
Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41, 42 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment) (including Roberts's quotation from Harrison).
83. Ramaprakash v. FAA, 346 F.3d 1121, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
84. Gerald Gunther opens his biography of Hand by placing him in the pantheon of
American judges:
Learned Hand is numbered among a small group of truly great American judges
of the twentieth century, a group that includes Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
Louis Brandeis, and Benjamin Cardozo. Yet among these judges, only Hand
never sat on the Supreme Court.
GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE xv (1994).
85. Ramaprakash, 346 F.3d at 1122 (footnote omitted).
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This passage, his only cite to Hand, nonetheless suggests Roberts's invocation of
the Second Circuit Judge as both role model and muse. Hand's style anticipates
Roberts's own preference for figurative language ("fall into grooves") and a
colloquial tone ("God save you to get them out"), just as Hand's insistence on
judicial restraint finds echoes in Roberts's jurisprudence. But Hand turns out to be
only one in a line of great American judges that Roberts invokes. Just as
Ramaprakash opens with a quote from Hand, it closes with a quote from one of
Hand's admirers, Oliver Wendell Holmes: "We have it on high authority that 'the
tendency of the law must always be to narrow the field of uncertainty.' O.W.
Holmes, The Common Law 127 (1881). The Board's unexplained departures from
precedent do the opposite. ' 6 As Roberts himself might say, he ends as he began,
with a quote from another great judge, one whose epigrammatic style influences
Roberts's later opinions.
8 7
Roberts's connection to Hand and Holmes turns out to be mediated by his
connection with another distinguished federal appellate judge, Henry J. Friendly,
who sat on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from 1959 to 1986 and for
whom Roberts clerked from 1979 to 19809 Friendly published a volume of essays,
Benchmarks,9" in 1967, and Roberts quotes from it six times in the course of his
opinions. Some of these references are secondary. The Hand quote, for example,
appears in a Friendly essay, More Definite Standards of Administrative Action: The
Need, although Roberts cites to Benchmarks rather than to the specific essay.
9
'
86. Id. at 1130. According to Gunther, "Holmes had hoped that Hand would be named
to the Supreme Court, and Holmes continued to sing his praises, telling visitors that he
considered Hand's judicial work 'the real thing."' GUNTHER, supra note 84, at 346
(emphasis in original).
87. Roberts quotes Holmes a second time in a dissenting opinion that rejects the
criminal defendant's argument that the police lacked a basis for believing that he was driving
a stolen car:
The majority doubts the rationale for replacing a stolen vehicle's real tags with
stolen tags and therefore discounts the inference that the car might have been
stolen.... But lawyers learn early on that "a page of history is worth a volume
of logic." New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349... (1921) (Holmes,
J.). Officer Garboe's history with stolen tags had confirmed that they, more
often than not, led to real tags in the trunk. The reported cases confirm that
criminals often use stolen tags on stolen cars. This history is enough to support
the officers' inferring from the stolen tags and the lack of any registration
(current or expired) linking Jackson to the car that the car mighi well have been
stolen.
United States v. Jackson, 415 F.3d 88, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Roberts, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original). Although Holmes wrote for the Court and the use of his name was
unnecessary, Roberts includes it. For examples of Holmes' epigrams, see infra note 112.
88. Henry Jacob Friendly, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf (follow "Judges of the
United States Courts" hyperlink; then in search field type "friendly"; then follow "Friendly,
Henry Jacob" hyperlink).
89. Supreme Court Biographies, supra note 1.
90. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS (1967).
91. Ramaprakash, 346 F.3d at 1122 n.1 (explaining that the material was "quoted in
Henry J. Friendly, Benchmarks 106 (1967)"). Although Roberts omits part of the quotation,
Friendly notes that administrative agencies "fall into grooves just as the judges are so apt to
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When Roberts quotes Felix Frankfurter's celebrated advice on statutory
interpretation, he also does so by way of Friendly, who was Frankfurter's student at
Harvard Law School: "This calls to mind what Judge Friendly described as Felix
Frankfurter's 'threefold imperative to law students' in his landmark statutory
interpretation course: '(1) Read the statute; (2) read the statute; (3) read the statute!'
Henry J. Friendly, Benchmarks 202 (1967). "92 Roberts cites appreciatively to two
other Supreme Court Justices, Brandeis and Cardozo. The reference to Brandeis,
for whom Friendly clerked, is a quotation from another Benchmarks essay, Mr.
Justice Brandeis-The Quest for Reason:
Not all opinions can aspire to what was said of those of Justice Brandeis-that
in them "the right doctrine emerges in heavenly glory and the wrong view is
consigned to the lower circle of hell," HENRY J. FRIENDLY, Mr. Justice
Brandeis-The Questfor Reason, in BENCHMARKS 291, 294 (1967). 9'
Even though Roberts quotes directly from Cardozo on the subject of judicial style
("Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate
thought, they end often by enslaving it" 94), it is worth noting that the first words of
Friendly's first Benchmarks essay, entitled Reactions of a Lawyer-Newly-Become-
Judge, are "Judge Cardozo." 95 And Holmes, too, is the subject of a Benchmarks
essay, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Common Law, discussing the monumental
Holmes book that Roberts cites.
96
It is thus hard to sidestep the notion that Roberts's true judicial mentor was
Judge Friendly, who is connected through his law school experience, his clerkship,
and his scholarship to the line of judges that runs from Holmes through Brandeis,
Cardozo, and Hand, to Frankfurter. And it also seems evident that what Roberts has
drawn from a subset of these judges-Holmes, Frankfurter, and Friendly himself-
is an affinity for a core of judicial principles that includes clear standards and close
textual readings. Roberts's direct citations to Friendly illustrate the lessons leamed.
On the subject of statutory interpretation grounded in the text, Roberts quotes
Friendly for the proposition that "whatever degree of confidence about
congressional purpose one derives from the legislative history, that purpose must
find expression 'within the permissible limits of the language' before it can be
given effect." 97 And, faced with an argument for a totality of the circumstances test
do." Id.
92. In re England, 375 F.3d 1169, 1181-82 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Roberts also quotes
Frankfurter directly to conclude a concurrence in another case: "As Justice Frankfurter once
put it: 'These are perplexing questions. Their difficulty admonishes us to observe the wise
limitations on our function and to confine ourselves to deciding only what is necessary to the
disposition of the immediate case.' Whitehouse v. Illinois Central R. Co., 349 U.S. 366, 372-
73, 75 S. Ct. 845, 850, 99 L.Ed. 1155 (1955)." PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enforcement
Admin., 362 F.3d, 786, 809-8 10 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment).
93. Taucher v. Brown-Hruska, 396 F.3d 1168, 1173-74 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
94. Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 373 F.3d 152, 157 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (quoting Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.)).
95. Reactions of a Lawyer-Newly-Become-Judge, in FRIENDLY, supra note 90, at 1.
96. Mr. Justice Holmes and the Common Law, in FRIENDLY, supra note 90, at 285.
97. U.S. ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 495 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(quoting FRIENDLY, supra note 90, at 216).
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for agency decisions, Roberts quotes Friendly's analogy for the need to define
standards more precisely: "'Lack of definite standards creates a void into which
attempts to influence are bound to rush; legal vacuums are quite like physical ones
in that respect.' 98 In a case on a related issue, Roberts again finds in Friendly a
useful image for restraining agency discretion: the need "to canalize the broad
stream into a number of narrower ones." 99 Benchmarks seems to have served as a
steady source of judicial guidance for Roberts as he made the transition from
appellate attorney to appellate judge, linking him not just to Judge Friendly himself
but also to the like-minded judges who preceded him on the federal bench.l1°
F. Tone: The Skeptic Speaks
As these assorted rhetorical strategies demonstrate, Roberts is a deliberate and
self-conscious stylist who takes pleasure in the expressive possibilities of language
even in his briefest and most routine opinions. Roberts as stylist, however, also
cultivates a distinctive tone that tends to unify his brief body of work. That tone is
genial, never harsh or venomous. But it is also markedly detached, often
commenting ironically on the behavior of litigants and decision makers alike. That
skepticism is another quality that links Roberts to three of his admired
predecessors, Hand, Holmes, and, to a lesser extent, Friendly. Like those judges,
Roberts avoids sweeping pronouncements of ideological certitude.'0' Instead, he
98. Lemoyne-Owen Coll. v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting
FRIENDLY, supra note 90, at 104).
99. PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 802 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (quoting FRIENDLY, supra note
90, at 97).
100. See Daniel Breen, Avoiding "Wild Blue Yonders ": The Prudentialism of Henry J.
Friendly and John Roberts, S.D. L. REV. 73 (2007) (examining Friendly's jurisprudence and
its potential influence on Roberts).
101. According to biographer G. Edward White, "Holmes had repeatedly declared
himself to be a philosophical skeptic, one who was unsure about the meaning of truth, which
he once defined as 'the sum of my intellectual limitations."' G. EDWARD WHITE, OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 135 (2006); see also G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 481-82 (1993) (discussing Holmes's skepticism). White
also notes that Holmes "pioneered in the development of 'deferential' judging in a
majoritarian constitutional democracy." Id. at 487. Similarly, Hand's biographer, Gerald
Gunther, finds that "Hand's dominant theme was his claim that the spirit of liberty was
skeptical." GUNTHER, supra note 84, at 552. Gunther underscores that skepticism when he
cites from Hand's celebrated 1944 speech delivered on "I Am an American Day" in Central
Park--"the most memorable words of his address, certainly the most widely quoted he ever
spoke"-where Hand says "The spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that it is
right." Id. at 549 (emphasis added). Like Holmes, Hand displayed an "awareness of his
limited role as a judge enforcing the legislature's purposes." Id. at 304. In several respects
Friendly followed in the skeptical tradition of Holmes and Hand. Wilfred Feinberg, who
served for almost twenty years with Friendly on the Second Circuit, has called him "the
preeminent appellate judge of his generation, as Learned Hand had been of the generation
before." Wilfred Feinberg, in In Memoriam: Henry J. Friendly, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1709,
1713 (1986). As Paul Freund elaborates, "[h]e combined massive documentation and sharply
critical, often astringent, analysis with invariably constructive, or reconstructive, proposals."
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repeatedly identifies two basic principles that shape his jurisprudence: common
sense rooted in human experience and a straightforward reading of statutory
language. Together, these principles link his style to the substance of his opinions.
Roberts's reliance on both principles surfaces early in his judicial career. In his
third opinion, he criticizes an earlier decision of his own circuit for an interpretation
that is "contrary not only to common sense, but to the text of Rule 1.4 as well"' 2
and then goes on to reject the petitioner's challenge to a literal reading of another
provision as "not the most damning criticism when it comes to statutory
interpretation."' 0 3 In a later case, he is skeptical of an NLRB holding, willing to
believe that the board "may have an adequate explanation" for its result but
requiring more: "We cannot, however, assume that such an explanation exists until
we see it. ' 1°4 Roberts is equally open-minded and skeptical toward a litigant's
argument: "Totten offers no reason, and we can think of none."' 0 5 The court has
done its best for Totten, but he has failed to provide it with what it needs to accept
his position. Roberts extends his skepticism more broadly to arguments based on
the canons of statutory interpretation, noting parenthetically of opposing canons
that "there always seems to be one."' 6 Elsewhere, he sums up his approach
succinctly: "Give me English words over Latin maxims."' 1 7 This is the voice of the
man of reason faced with ingenious but unduly subtle constructs.
In assessing factual contentions, Roberts brings a comparable skepticism to bear
on human behavior, Faced with the FAA's curious claim that the operator of a
small air service should be required under the regulations to schedule his own
random drug test, Roberts pinpoints the psychological absurdity of that position:
"The regulations foreclose any assumption that a DER [designated employer
representative] who is already using illegal drugs will nonetheless handle his own
selection notice with impeccable scrupulousness and truthfulness-to his inevitable
and substantial detriment."'' 08 A defendant arguing in support of a sentence shorter
than required by the Sentencing Guidelines has "gamely attempted to rationalize"
the district court's decision but fails because the court "was not attempting to apply
the Guidelines in this case; it instead seemed intent on defying them-and 18
U.S.C. § 3553(c) to boot."' 1 9 When film studios are unable to produce the receipt
needed to secure royalties from the Copyright Office, Roberts notes that "[e]ven at
this remove, we can sense the intensity of the searches"'"1 for the missing papers
but spares little sympathy for the litigants; quite simply, under the regulations "the
studios are out of luck.""' Such passages combine a realistic perception of the
Paul Freund, in id. at 1719. Todd Rakoff, a former clerk to Friendly, concludes that "[w]hat
counted with him, always, were legal arguments. Sentiment had no appeal." Todd Rakoff, in
id. at 1726.
102. Consumer Elecs. Ass'n v. FCC, 347 F.3d 291, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
103. Id.
104. Lemoyne-Owen Coll. v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
105. U.S. ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488,492 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
106. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Watson, 410 F.3d 722, 734 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
107. Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring
in part and in the judgment).
108. Duchek v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 364 F.3d 311, 316 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
109. United States v. Tucker, 386 F.3d 273, 278 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
110. Universal City Studios LLP v. Peters, 402 F.3d 1238, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
111. Id. at 1244.
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human situation with the judicial detachment to separate that situation from its
legal consequences.
That element of detachment sometimes produces epigrammatic statements
reminiscent of Holmes.112 Assessing the amount of time provided by the trial court
for a defendant's review of Jencks Act materials, Roberts finds that "a prompt
proceeding is good but a fair one is necessary." ' 13 When a less than diligent
employee paraphrases his former employer as objecting that he "had been less than
slavish in his attention to the details of some of his duties," Roberts finds that "this
simply gives euphemism a bad name." ' 14 As a dissenter, Roberts "wholeheartedly
subscribe[s] to the sentiments expressed in the concurring opinion about the Fourth
Amendment's place among our most prized freedoms."'1 5 He nonetheless finds no
Fourth Amendment violation on the facts before the court and concludes with what
might be the distillation of his jurisprudence: "But sentiments do not decide cases;
facts and the law do."
'
"
16
Not all of Roberts's ironies are targeted at litigants and decision makers.
Occasionally he responds with a whimsical playfulness to some aspect of the case
before him. Thus, dissenting from the denial of an en banc hearing for a successful
Commerce Clause challenge, Roberts dryly characterizes the issue: "The panel's
approach in this case leads to the result that regulating the taking of a hapless toad
that, for reasons of its own, lives its entire life in California constitutes regulating
'Commerce... among the several States."' 17 The toad, hitherto an innocent pawn
in the litigation, assumes a sympathetic identity as the inadvertent instigator of
serious constitutional litigation. Faced with yet another power transmission case,
this one involving regulation of sales by Canadian utilities to customers in the
United States, Roberts opens his opinion with a brief meditation on what has
brought the case before him:
It was a close thing, but Benedict Arnold's bold plan to capture Canada for
the Revolution fell short at the Battle of Quebec in early 1776. As a result, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission must now decide when affiliates of
Canadian utilities-utilities not subject to FERC jurisdiction-may sell power
at market-based rates in the United States.
118
112. Holmes' celebrated epigrams include "[g]reat cases, like hard cases, make bad law,"
N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting); "the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,"
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); and "[g]reat
Constitutional provisions must be administered with caution. Some play must be allowed for
the joints of the machine," Mo., Kan. and Tenn. R. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904).
113. United States v. Stanfield, 360 F.3d 1345, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("[W]e need more
solid footing before deciding where we stand.").
114. Koszola v. FDIC, 393 F.3d 1294, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
115. United States v. Jackson, 415 F.3d 88, 105 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
116. Id.
117. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
118. Consumers Energy Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 367 F.3d 915, 917
(D.C. Cir. 2004).
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This return to first principles serves as an ironic reminder that even highly technical
regulatory matters are connected to the sweep of history and that the outcome of a
single battle has placed this perhaps unwelcome case on the court's docket.
G. Case Study: The Crying Child
The case that best illustrates Roberts's use of rhetorical strategies, Hedgepeth v.
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority,' 19 is unusual among his opinions
in its subject matter: two serious constitutional claims arising from a mundane
incident. The opening paragraph of Roberts's opinion bears quotation in full for its
presentation of the legal and factual aspects of the case in distinct styles:
No one is very happy about the events that led to this litigation. A twelve-
year-old girl was arrested, searched, and handcuffed. Her shoelaces were
removed, and she was transported in the windowless rear compartment of a
police vehicle to a juvenile processing center, where she was booked,
fingerprinted, and detained until released to her mother some three hours
later-all for eating a single french fry in a Metrorail station. The child was
frightened, embarrassed, and crying throughout the ordeal. The district court
described the policies that led to her arrest as "foolish," and indeed the policies
were changed after those responsible endured the sort of publicity reserved for
adults who make young girls cry. The question before us, however, is not
whether these policies were a bad idea, but whether they violated the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. Like the district court, we conclude
that they did not, and accordingly we affirm.' 20
Roberts's first sentence establishes consensus on the undisputed facts of the case,
the arrest of a twelve-year-old for eating her french fry while her friend purchased a
fare card at the Metro station. There will clearly be no effort to mitigate or
underplay the event. Roberts is unsparing in detailing the unpleasant consequences
of that arrest-the "ordeal"-and makes no attempt to present the plaintiff as an
adolescent rather than a "child." It is also worth noting that he does not use the
plaintiff's first name, a choice that has the effect of distancing the court and the
reader somewhat from Ansche Hedgepeth's experience. Nonetheless, Roberts also
carefully highlights the disproportion between offense and consequence: the ordeal
is "all for eating a single french fry."
Thus far, the facts seem to point toward a victory for Ansche, as does the next
sentence, which reports that the district court considered the policies authorizing
her arrest "foolish" and that the public reaction prompted their swift reversal. But
Roberts's tone now shifts from sympathy to irony, as he points out that "those
responsible endured the sort of publicity reserved for adults who make young girls
cry." Ansche is no longer a child or even a solitary victim ("young girls"), and
government officials are also suffering some consequences. The tone shifts again in
the final two sentences of the paragraph as Roberts turns from facts to law. The
paragraph turns on "however," the pivot between policy and law, and Roberts
defines the issue presented as one of constitutional law in a straightforward
119. 386 F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
120. Id. at 1150.
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sentence lacking any rhetorical flourishes. Allying his court with the lower court in
finding no constitutional violation, he ends the paragraph with a conventional
judicial summary: "and accordingly we affirm." With the uncomfortable facts of
the case acknowledged and now out of the way, Roberts can turn to the legal
analysis that is the sole basis for the decision.
Although the next section of the opinion has a narrative introduction ("It was the
start of another school year .... , 121), Ansche is no longer the heroine, and Roberts
can resume his detached attitude toward the episode. The Metro's "zero-tolerance"
policy for food on its premises "had more fateful consequences for children than
for adults," since under controlling law adults merely received a citation on the spot
while minors were instead taken into custody. 122 Ansche's mother, suing as her
next friend, argues that this difference in treatment violated her daughter's rights to
equal protection under the Fifth Amendment and to freedom from physical restraint
under the Fourth Amendment. On the equal protection issue, Roberts rejects the
claim that classifications based on youth rather than age merit heightened scrutiny:
Nor are the characteristics that define the young markedly more obvious or
distinguishing than those than define the old. In fact, the characteristics are
simply opposite sides of the same coin-age. Youth is also far less
"immutable" than old age: minors mature to majority and literally outgrow their
prior status; the old can but grow more so.
123
The passage has many of his stylistic signatures: the familiar adage, the triple
alliteration of "minors mature to majority," and the opposition of youth and age
that ends with a wistful epigram. Responding to the argument that the young,
unlike the old, lack political power, he finds that children do "attract the attention
of the legislature."' 24 He concludes with another of his carefully crafted repetitions,
again reminiscent of Justice Jackson: "We are rightly skeptical of paternalistic
arguments when it comes to classifications addressing adults, . . . but the concern
that the state not treat adults like children surely does not prevent it from treating
children like children."'
' 25
Having determined that rational basis is the standard of review, Roberts has little
difficulty in finding "that the no-citation policy for minors is rationally related to
the legitimate goal of promoting parental awareness and involvement with children
who commit delinquent acts.' 26 That conclusion is supported by empirical
observations about youthful veracity:
A child often will not be carrying a form of identification, and there is nothing
to stop one from giving an officer a false name-an entirely fanciful one or,
better yet, the name of the miscreant who pushed them on the playground that
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1154.
124. Id. at 1155.
125. Id. (citation omitted).
126. Id. at 1156.
2008] 1017
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
morning. In this situation parents would be none the wiser concerning the
behavior of their children.'27
After rooting his analysis in his perception of childhood reality, Roberts returns to
the question of policy versus law already resolved in the opening paragraph: "The
district court had and we too may have thoughts on the wisdom of this policy
choice-it is far from clear that the gains in certainty of notification are worth the
youthful trauma and tears-but it is not our place to second-guess such legislative
judgments."' 128 The alliterative reference to "trauma and tears" alludes briefly, with
mild irony, to the compelling human aspect of the case, but only to reaffirm the
limits of the judicial role.129
Although Roberts avoids mention of Ansche's first name in his opening
paragraph, throughout the rest of the opinion he attributes all the legal arguments to
her, ignoring the fact that her mother is the named plaintiff. Thus, for example,
Ansche "first contends,"'130 "alternatively argues,' ' 131 "reasons,"' 132 and finally "has
not made the case that her arrest was unconstitutional. 1 3 3 The convention of
attributing counsel's legal arguments to the client in this case contradicts Roberts's
earlier reliance on the unreliability of children. By transforming the frightened,
crying Ansche, a child likely to mislead a police officer about her name, into the
nominal source of serious constitutional arguments, Roberts completes the
rhetorical transition from sympathy to legal detachment. The opinion is a
rhetorically skillful example, in one of Roberts's adages, of having your cake and
eating it too: demonstrating both the compassion of the court for Ansche's painful
experience and the judicial obligation to treat Ansche with the same detached
professionalism as a litigant twice her age.
II. REFINING A JUDICIAL PERSONALITY: ROBERTS AS CHIEF JUSTICE
A single term on the Supreme Court, less than half the length of his brief service
on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ("Court
of Appeals"), is scarcely sufficient to define the style or substance of the new Chief
Justice's jurisprudence. Nonetheless, the first Roberts opinions-eight for the
Court, two concurrences, one dissent, and two opinions concurring in part and
dissenting in part-show a noticeable continuity with his earlier work, especially in
the judicial voice that he employs. Virtually all of his favorite stylistic devices
appear in some form, and the perspective on human behavior reflected in
Hedgepeth informs several Supreme Court opinions as well. Observers noted that
Chief Justice Roberts showed no hesitation in assuming the leadership of the Court
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1156-57.
129. Id. at 1157. The Fourth Amendment issue gives Roberts less difficulty. He finds that
a recent precedent, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, permits a police officer who has witnessed
a criminal offense to arrest the offender without being subjected to a reasonableness test. Id.
at 1157-59 (citing Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001)).
130. Id. at 1153.
131. Id. at 1155.
132. Id. at 1157.
133. Id. at 1159.
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from his first day in the center chair,' 34 and his earliest opinions show a similar
confidence in his distinctive execution of the opinion form.
A. Diction and Metaphor
Although Roberts's diction is somewhat more restrained than in his work on the
Court of Appeals, particularly in his first opinions for a unanimous Supreme Court,
by the spring of 2006 his pleasure in unexpected language reemerged. Writing for
an almost unanimous Court in a case that hinges on a struggle between several
adults and a juvenile,' 35 Roberts offers an assortment of synonyms for the main
event: "melee,"' 136 "tumult,"'137 and "fracas."' 138 He enhances his vivid diction with a
narrative in the present tense: "A juvenile, fists clenched, was being held back by
several adults. As the officers watch, he breaks free and strikes one of the adults in
the face, sending the adult to the sink spitting blood., 139 The immediacy of the
scene, with its bloody conclusion, provides rhetorical support for the position that
the police have both a right and a duty to intervene. 140 In another almost unanimous
opinion issued a week earlier, Roberts refers to "[t]he animating principle" of
several cases "announced in their progenitor"'14 1 and the "hollow rhetoric' ' 42 of
standing doctrine that would result from the extension of jurisdiction to the
plaintiffs' case. In an echo of his earlier fondness for unusual adverbs, he observes
in dissent that "[t]he majority aphoristically states that '[w]hen identity is in
question, motive is key.""
143
Roberts's taste for metaphor and analogy also reappears. Some of these usages
are drawn from familiar expressions: a weak government presentation "cannot
carry the day"; 144 a court exercising its discretion is not "writing on an entirely
clean slate"; 45 and a statute's discretionary fee provision places "no heavy
134. Linda Greenhouse has observed of Roberts that "there is no doubt that he is in
charge of the courtroom." Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Memo: In the Roberts Court,
More Room for Argument, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2006, at A19.
135. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 398 (2006). The case was argued on April 24
and decided on May 22. Id. Justice Stevens wrote a brief concurring opinion calling this "an
odd flyspeck of a case" to which the Court should not have granted certiorari. Id. at 407-408
(Stevens, J., concurring). Nevertheless, Stevens did not quarrel with the substance of
Roberts's majority opinion. See id. at 407-409.
136. Id. at 400.
137. Id. at401,406.
138. Id. at 406.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 343 (2006). The case was decided on
May 15. Id. at 332. Justice Ginsburg concurred in part and in the judgment. Id. at 354
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 353.
143. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 571 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting id. at 540 (majority opinion)).
144. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 432
(2006).
145. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
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congressional thumb on either side of the scales."' Occasionally, Roberts chooses
a more original and resonant metaphor, as when he rejects the majority's
application of the actual innocence exception to the usual procedural bar for habeas
claims. After painstakingly reviewing the evidence introduced at trial, he observes
ironically that "[a]ccording to the majority, House has picked the trifecta of
evidence that places conviction outside the realm of choices any juror, acting
reasonably, would make." 147 Under the majority's analysis, he suggests, the judicial
factfinding process has become instead a lucky bet.
Roberts also seems intrigued by the comparison of the legal system with athletic
competitions. Endorsing the right of police officers to enter a home when they see a
potentially injurious fight in progress, he chooses a simile to distinguish law
enforcement from sport: "The role of a peace officer includes preventing violence
and restoring order, not simply rendering first aid to casualties; an officer is not like
a boxing (or hockey) referee, poised to stop a bout only if it becomes too one-
sided. The parenthetical reference to hockey is a characteristically playful touch
that expands the image to include the accepted pervasiveness of violence in that
sport, suggesting that such tolerance is not appropriate in law enforcement. The
image also evokes another sports simile Roberts employed in his opening statement
at his confirmation hearing, this time linking judges to umpires: "Judges are like
umpires. Umpires don't make the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and
a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited
role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire."'149 This time the
comparison is one of constraint rather than empowerment; where police officers
may intervene in events on the ground, judges must remain on the sidelines with
only the authority provided by the rules. The second image is less effective than the
first-judges do in fact have more latitude in their courtrooms than umpires on the
field of play-but both reflect Roberts's affinity for metaphoric modes of thought.
That same affinity appears when Roberts constructs elaborate analogies to make
his point. Finding insufficient notice to satisfy due process in a state's reliance on
tax notices sent by certified mail and returned unopened, he offers a striking visual
image:
If the Commissioner prepared a stack of letters to mail to delinquent taxpayers,
handed them to the postman, and then watched as the departing postman
accidentally dropped the letters down a storm drain, one would certainly expect
the Commissioner's office to prepare a new stack of letters and send them
again.150
The analogy exaggerates the challenged policy just enough to clarify why the
state's refusal to make additional efforts to contact delinquent homeowners ignores
the potential contingencies of the postal service.' 5 1 When he dissents from the
146. Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005).
147. House, 547 U.S.. at 566 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis in original).
148. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406 (2006).
149. Confirmation Hearing, supra note 40, at 55 (opening statement of nominee).
150. 1d. at229.
151. Roberts provides another less exaggerated analogy to make the same point: "It
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Court's holding in Georgia v. Randolph that one resident of a shared dwelling may
withhold consent to a warrantless search, Roberts again translates doctrine into
ordinary experience, explaining that the majority position "simply leads to the
common stalemate of two gentlemen insisting that the other enter a room first."'
152
The visual image places the two residents--one willing to permit a search, the
other resistant--on equal footing, with equal fights to control the situation.
Roberts's dissent in Georgia v. Randolph also contains his most elaborate-and
playful-use of figurative language as he rings changes on the familiar adage that a
man's home is his castle, first introduced in Justice Souter's majority opinion,' 53 to
build the counter argument. The majority's position, Roberts argues, protects only
an objecting resident who has the good fortune to be at the door when the police
arrive, and "[i]t seems a bit overwrought to characterize [the majority's] approach
as affording great protection to a man in his castle."'154 Roberts then reminds the
majority that its rule will have possibly threatening or dislocating practical
consequences for the consenting resident, especially, as in this case, when it is the
wife who wishes to admit the police to find evidence of her husband's criminal
activity: 155 "The majority would afford the now quite vulnerable consenting co-
occupant sufficient time to gather her belongings and leave, apparently putting to
one side the fact that it is her castle, too.' 56 In his final paragraph, Roberts returns
to what he sees as the majority's flawed assumption that its holding will protect
privacy in spite of the practical realities of such situations:
The majority reminds us, in high tones, that a man's home is his castle, but
even under the majority's rule, it is not his castle if he happens to be absent,
asleep in the keep, or otherwise engaged when the constable arrives at the gate.
Then it is his co-owner's castle. And, of course, it is not his castle if he wants to
consent to entry, but his co-owner objects. 157
The recurrent image, with its overtones of sovereign ights, is steadily eroded by
the contrast between those abstract ights and the humbler realities of shared
domestic life.
would not be inconsistent with the approach the Court has taken in notice cases to ask, with
respect to a procedure under which telephone calls were placed to owners, what the State did
when no one answered." Id at 231.
152. 547 U.S. 103, 129 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Roberts later offers a second analogy
to support his point: "If two friends share a locker and one keeps contraband inside, he might
trust that his friend will not let others look inside. But by sharing private space, privacy has
'already been frustrated' with respect to the lockermate." Id. at 131 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984)).
153. According to Souter, "[wie have, after all, lived our whole national history with an
understanding of 'the ancient adage that a man's home is his castle [to the point that t]he
poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown."' Id. at 115
(quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958)).
154. Id. at 135 n.1.
155. Seeid. at 138.
156. Id. at 139 n.2 (citation omitted).
157. Id. at 142 (citation omitted).
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B. The Judicial Voice
Although Roberts continues to ground his opinions in the daily reality of human
experience, he has not to date written with the same degree of informality as in his
Court of Appeals opinions. The highly colloquial diction has largely vanished, and
he seems much less likely to use conversational syntactical structures or asides to
engage the reader. Nonetheless, there are flashes of his earlier style which suggest
that he has not entirely abandoned these practices. In his first opinion, one written
for a unanimous Court, he observes that the complaint in a removal case was not
clear as to the amount in controversy and adds breezily, between dashes, "no reason
it should be, since the complaint had been filed in state court."'1 58 In other opinions,
he begins one sentence with "[w]orse yet,"' 159 inserts "of course" in three others, 160
and points out in dissent that the majority has provided "a complete lack of
practical guidance for the police in the field, let alone for the lower courts."' 61 In
the same dissent, he also notes that the majority "has taken a great deal of pain in
altering Fourth Amendment doctrine, for precious little (if any) gain in privacy.' 162
And in Jones he concedes that "Mr. Jones should have been more diligent with
respect to his property, no question." 163 There are also a few instances of informal
diction. A previously unresolved due process issue concerning notice is "a new
wrinkle,"'164 the majority's opinion is "quite a leap" from Justice Jackson's
examples, 165 and "proposed rulemaking went nowhere." 166 Most of the cited
examples come from Roberts's earlier opinions on the Court, including one dissent.
On balance, Roberts's first term opinions have a noticeably less conversational tone
than their Court of Appeals counterparts, and Roberts seems, at the moment, to be
hesitant to employ his strategies of informal engagement.
One strategy that Roberts is not hesitant about, particularly in his dissents, is the
use of repetition and balance to emphasize a point, a practice sometimes enhanced
by the addition of italics to highlight the paired concepts or terms. In Georgia v.
158. Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 134 (2005). Akhil Amar has
commented appreciatively on Roberts's use of the dash. Linda Greenhouse, Term One: His
Hipness, John G. Roberts, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2006, § 4, at 5. One example Amar notes is
Roberts's majority opinion in Jones v. Flowers finding inadequate notice to satisfy due
process: "In response to the returned form suggesting that Jones had not received notice that
he was about to lose his property, the State did-nothing." 547 U.S. 220, 234 (2006).
According to Amar, "That little dash is brilliant.... Every ordinary citizen can understand
the frustration of dealing with government stupidity." Greenhouse, supra.
159. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 57
(2006).
160. Id. at 58; Martin, 546 U.S. at 139; Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669,
2687 (2006).
161. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 142 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 141.
163. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 234 (2006).
164. Id. at227.
165. Id. at 233.
166. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 758 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
Roberts uses the same phrase in another opinion: "But this fundamental predicate to the
majority's analysis gets us nowhere." Randolph, 547 U.S. at 129 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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Randolph, for example, he begins his critique of the majority by pointing out that
its assumption about the consequences of sharing a residence may be just as easily
viewed from the opposite perspective: "Does the objecting cotenant accede to the
consenting cotenant's wishes, or the other way around?"'' 67 He then counters the
majority's criticism of his dissent by reworking its language to his own advantage:
The majority also mischaracterizes this dissent as assuming that "privacy
shared with another individual is privacy waived for all purposes including
warrantless searches by the police." The point, of course, is not that a person
waives his privacy by sharing space with others such that police may enter at
will, but that sharing space necessarily entails a limited yielding of privacy to
the person with whom the space is shared, such that the other person shares
authority to consent to a search of the shared space.
168
The alliterative phrase "shared space" appears, with variations, four times,
redirecting the emphasis from the majority's abstract "privacy shared" to the
concrete reality of a physical dwelling shared with someone else.
In his later dissent in House v. Bell, Roberts elaborates the technique even
further. Rejecting the Court's detailed review of the evidence from a murder trial,
he insists that "[t]he District Court did not painstakingly conduct an evidentiary
hearing to compile a record for us to sort through transcript by transcript and
photograph by photograph."' 169 He then goes on to underscore his skepticism about
the defendant's veracity through the same device, repeating the word "lie" four
times in two sentences:
House retold this story to the District Court, saying that he initially lied to
police because he was on parole and did not want to draw attention to himself.
In other words, having nothing to hide and facing a murder charge, House
lied-and when he was caught in the lie, he said he lied not to escape the
murder charge, but solely to avoid unexplained difficulties with his parole
officer. 1
70
Continuing his assault on the defendant's credibility, Roberts combines repetition
with syntactical variations to challenge the majority's focus on motive:
The majority aphoristically states that "[w]hen identity is in question, motive is
key." Not at all. Sometimes, when identity is in question, alibi is key. Here,
House came up with one-and it fell apart, later admitted to be fabricated when
his girlfriend would not lie to protect him. Scratches from a cat, indeed. 7 '
The fragment "Not at all" emphatically contradicts the quotation from the majority
before reformulating the majority's quotation to shift the focus to the defendant's
167. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 129 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
168. Id. at 134 n.1 (citation omitted) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 115 n.4
(majority opinion)).
169. 547 U.S. 518, 561 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
170. Id. at 567-68 (citation omitted) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
171. Id. at 571 (citation omitted) (quoting id. at 540 (majority opinion)).
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fabricated alibi. The final comment, another sentence fragment, invokes a detail of
that abandoned alibi with sarcastic economy before concluding with a single word
of scornful rejection. The dismissive tone covers both the mendacious defendant
and a majority willing to reject the district court's conclusions. Common sense,
Roberts suggests, tells us that the key issue is the discredited alibi and that the
majority is misguided to ignore it.
C. Mentors and Masters
In his first Supreme Court term Roberts made only a handful of allusions to
sources other than case law, including, as Linda Greenhouse has pointed out, only
one law review article. 172 Numbers, however, tell only part of the story. It is surely
noteworthy-and not coincidental-that in his first opinion for the Court, Martin v.
Franklin Capital Corporation, Roberts contrived to cite both the judges for whom
he clerked. The issue in the case-whether plaintiffs could recover attorney's fees
under a federal statute when their case was first removed by the defendants to
federal court and subsequently remanded back to state court-scarcely provides
much scope for citation. 173 Roberts solves the problem by citing Chief Justice
Rehnquist for a basic proposition in statutory construction: "As Chief Justice
Rehnquist explained for the Court in Fogerty v. Fantasy Inc., '[t]he word "may"
clearly connotes discretion." 7 4 A vast number of sources were available in support
of that proposition, but Roberts chooses to cite Rehnquist in a gesture of respect for
his late predecessor. Judge Friendly is also cited for a broad legal tenet, though in a
less direct manner. Roberts first provides his own epigrammatic statement:
"Discretion is not whim, and limiting discretion according to legal standards helps
promote the basic principle of justice that like cases should be decided alike."'1 75 He
then supports that statement with an indirect citation: "See Friendly, Indiscretion
about Discretion, 31 Emory L.J. 747, 758 (1982)." The cited page discusses the
need for consistency among not only like but also strongly similar cases, although
Roberts is not interested in that refinement.' 76 The basis for the citation is less
focused on its content than its author, and Roberts makes his second gesture of
respect to a judge who is, as Roberts's Court of Appeals opinions reveal, a revered
mentor. In his inaugural opinion, Roberts thus locates himself as the successor to
both Rehnquist and Friendly.
In the first of his two concurrences, issued in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., Roberts again uses citations to locate himself within the community of
judges, this time within the more exclusive company of Supreme Court Justices.
When a unanimous Court held general principles for permanent injunctive relief
applicable under the Patent Act, Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg,
concurred. 177 The brief concurrence adds a single point to the majority opinion, the
value of history as a guide to the application of those principles. Roberts cites two
172. See Greenhouse, supra note 158.
173. Id. at 134-36.
174. Id. at 136 (citation omitted) (quoting 510 U.S. 517, 533 (1994)).
175. Id. at 139.
176. Henry Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982).
177. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
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sources in the concurrence, both of which are cases and both highly revealing. The
first source is, remarkably, his own first Supreme Court opinion in Martin issued
five months earlier. More specifically, he cites the sentence quoted above that
begins with the statement "[d]iscretion is not whim."'' 7 8 The second source is a
1921 Supreme Court opinion by Justice Holmes that contains one of his most
celebrated aphorisms: "When it comes to discerning and applying those standards,
in this area as others, 'a page of history is worth a volume of logic.""' 179 The citation
for the quoted passage includes the parenthetical information, not usually contained
in such references, indicating that it was an opinion of the Court by Justice
Holmes. 180 Together, the two citations stake out Roberts's place in the line of
Supreme Court Justices. By citing his own first opinion, Roberts suggests that,
however brief his service on the Court, he is now as authoritative as his colleagues
present and past. And by citing Holmes-as he did twice in his Court of Appeals
opinions, including another use of the same passage-he also suggests that he is
now linked to the great Justice not only as a disciple but also as a colleague. It is no
coincidence that Roberts's own aphorism about the restraint of judicial discretion is
followed by what is arguably Holmes's best-known aphorism. Although Roberts
was a clerk to Friendly and Rehnquist, he asserts a stylistic and substantive bond
with Holmes as well.
The final set of revealing references appears in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,
where the Court found that taxpayers lacked standing to challenge local tax
abatements and credits.' 8' Writing for the majority, Roberts turns first to principles,
citing Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison'82 for the Court's
authority to determine whether a true case or controversy is before it.' 83 Roberts
then cites a passage from a speech by Marshall to the House of Representatives
asserting the limits on the judicial power,' 84 and also cites James Madison's remark
to the Constitutional Convention that a case or controversy must be "of a Judiciary
Nature."' 185 Finally, Roberts cites Madison a second time for the distinction
between the plaintiffs's rights under the Commerce Clause and the Establishment
Clause. 18 6 Marbury is the classic cite for issues of judicial power, but Roberts's
interest in going outside the case law to include Marshall's speech and Madison's
views reinforces his commitment to history as well as judicial precedent as sources
for constitutional interpretation. After twice quoting Holmes on the value of
history, Roberts suits his actions to his cites, invoking both Marshall as legislator
and Madison as a drafter of the Constitution.
178. Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 134 (2005), cited with approval in
eBay, 547 U.S. at 395.
179. eBay, 547 U.S. at 395.
180. Id.
181. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 337 (2006).
182. Id. at 340.
183. Id. at 340-41.
184. Id. at 341 (citing 4 PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 95 (C. Cullen ed. 1984)).
185. Id. at 342 (citing 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 430 (M. Farrand
ed. 1966)).
186. Id. at 347-48 (citing 2 WRrnNGS OF JAMES MADISON 186 (G. Hunt ed. 1901)).
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D. Tone: The Skeptic Returns
Roberts's first term opinions for the Supreme Court show some subtle but
intriguing differences in tone from his Court of Appeals opinions. The Chief Justice
is clearly a deliberate stylist with an appreciation for the expressive nuances of
language, and the continuities of his opinions transcend the basic legal prose
characteristic of law clerks on both courts. Whatever the drafting procedures of his
chambers, it seems a fair assumption that Roberts, at the least, edits with a sharp
pen and decides when to give an opinion a particular edge. The fact that his
Supreme Court opinions are somewhat less conversational and playful in style than
his earlier work suggests that he still is in the process of shaping his judicial voice
to the demands of his new position. And it should come as no surprise that
Roberts's most striking rhetorical moments tend to come in his separate opinions,
both concurring and dissenting. That said, it is also clear that the distinctive tone of
his Court of Appeals opinions-skeptical, detached, good-natured but coolly
rational-has moved with him to the Supreme Court.
The Roberts edge appears in his first opinion, where he notes dryly, "[w]e have
it on good authority that 'a motion to [a court's] discretion is a motion, not to its
inclination, but to its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal
principles."'" 8 7 That "good authority" turns out to be Chief Justice Marshall in
United States v. Burr, and the passage is typical of Roberts: mildly ironic and at the
same time respectful of Marshall without giving overt praise. 188 Also typical of
Roberts is his note of candor in discussing the processes of government. In a
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) case, he observes, "[w]e have no cause
to pretend that the task assigned by Congress to the courts under RFRA is an easy
one."'1 9 He extends the same candor to the executive branch, finding that "[t]he
Government's argument echoes the classic rejoinder of bureaucrats throughout
history: If I make an exception for you, I'll have to make one for everybody, so no
exception.' ' 190 The criticism, though softened by the conversational voice of the
bureaucrat, nonetheless supports the Court's decision to grant an exception on the
facts of this case. When he writes for a unanimous Court to uphold the
constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment, which requires law schools receiving
federal funding to provide the same campus access for military and non-military
recruiters, Roberts reminds the law schools challenging the Amendment that law
students are not easily misled. Noting that the Court has previously "held that high
school students can appreciate the difference between speech a school sponsors and
speech the school permits because legally required to do so," he takes a mild jab at
the protective argument of the law schools: "Surely students have not lost that
ability by the time they get to law school.'
' 9
'
That note of skepticism toward easy generalizations is characteristic of
Roberts's voice. His dissent in Georgia v. Randolph, which is also his first separate
187. Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005).
188. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (C.C. Va. 1807), cited with approval in
Martin, 546 U.S. at 139.
189. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439
(2006).
190. Id. at 1223.
191. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 65 (2006).
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opinion, makes clear from its opening sentence his resistance to the broad
assumption he sees as underlying the majority's position: "The Court creates
constitutional law by surmising what is typical when a social guest encounters an
entirely atypical situation." 92 The carefully chosen word "surmising," while not
quite so harsh as "speculating" or "guessing" would have been, nonetheless accuses
the Court of operating at a remove from the realities of the situation, just as the play
on "typical" and "atypical" points out the potential limits of the Court's vision.
Roberts develops his point by painting a brief picture of the majority's surmise in
action: "Nevertheless, the majority is confident in assuming-confident enough to
incorporate its assumption into the Constitution-that an invited social guest who
arrives at the door of a shared residence, and is greeted by a disagreeable co-
occupant shouting 'stay out,' would simply go away."'' 93 His repetition of
"confident" as well as "assuming" and "assumption" prepares the ground for
Roberts's counterposition, a reliance instead on particular circumstances: "The fact
is that a wide variety of differing social situations can readily be imagined, giving
rise to quite different social expectations."' 94 He then spins out a series of differing
situations-a guest arriving for a birthday party, a traveler coming from a great
distance, a dwelling with a single room or one with common areas-to establish
that "[t]he possible scenarios are limitless."' 195 In an elegant echo of his opening
sentence, Roberts now demotes the Court's surmise to no more than "a hunch about
how people would typically act in an atypical situation."' 196 The entire passage
showcases a number of elements of Roberts's stylistic repertoire, including the use
of skepticism rather than blunt attack; the careful modulation of diction; the
deliberate repetition of key terms; and the circular resolution that, as in some of his
lower court opinions, ends where it began, after making its point. The passage also
illustrates a repeated theme in Roberts's jurisprudence, the preference for specific
facts over broad abstractions to resolve a case. Where the majority relies on its
assumption, Roberts insists that he will rely only on the particular circumstances of
the case before him. Style and substance merge in a preference for the particular
over the general.
The same preference, expressed by a similar rhetorical strategy, appears in
another of Roberts's separate opinions, this time a partial dissent from the
majority's application of the actual innocence exception to the procedural bar rule
in House v. Bell. Rejecting the majority's reading of the evidence submitted at the
petitioner's murder trial, Roberts distinguishes between theory and fact:
I suppose it is theoretically possible that the jeans were contaminated by
spillage before arriving at the FBI, that Agent Bigbee either failed to note or
lied about such spillage, and that the FBI then transferred the jeans into a
plastic bag and put them back inside the evidence container with the spilled
blood still sloshing around sufficiently to contaminate the outside of the plastic
bag as extensively as it did. This sort of unbridled speculation can theoretically
defeat any inconvenient fact, but does not suffice to convince me that the
192. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 127 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 129.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 130.
196. Id.
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District Court's factual finding-that the blood spilled after FBI testing-was
clearly erroneous.19
7
The passage opens with what seems to be a concession to the majority: its position
is "theoretically possible." The description of the facts necessary to support that
possibility then shifts abruptly from a neutral account of events to the likelihood of
"blood still sloshing around sufficiently" to create the evidence presented. The
choice of the word "sloshing"-a colloquial term of deliberate imprecision-makes
clear immediately Roberts's belief that such contamination is not even remotely
supported by the evidence. The repetition of "theoretically," this time linked to
"unbridled speculation," produces another of Roberts's circular effects-the return
to the same language that has now been transformed from a possibility to an
absurdity. Theory has come up against an "inconvenient fact" and lost. 1
98
E. A Case Study: The "Sordid Business"' 99 of Texas Redistricting
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, the highest profile case of
the 2005 term in which Roberts participated, 2° contains his most impassioned
rhetoric. This seems, on the face of it, a curious outcome, since Roberts joined
three of the four parts of Justice Kennedy's opinion, all upholding the Texas
redistricting plan, and dissented only from Part III, in which the Court found a
violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The dissent, however, argues
strenuously that the Court has erred in reaching what Roberts calls "its surprising
result" by holding that the creation of a new minority opportunity district dilutes
the voting strength of Latinos.20 1 In challenging the result, Roberts departs from his
usual detached stance and makes his strongest attack on some of his new
colleagues.
197. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 563 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
198. Roberts uses another rhetorical strategy to achieve the same end, the deflation of a
theoretical possibility. In the final paragraph of his dissent, he inserts parenthetical
qualifications to indicate the remote likelihood that the petitioner can prevail at a new
hearing:
The majority's conclusion is that given the sisters' testimony (if believed), and
Dr. Blake's rebutted testimony about how to interpret Agent Bigbee's enzyme
marker analysis summary (if accepted), combined with the revelation that the
semen on Mrs. Muncey's clothing was deposited by her husband (which the
jurors knew was just as likely as the semen having been deposited by House),
no reasonable juror would vote to convict.
Id. at 571-72.
199. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2663 (2006)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
200. Roberts did not participate in the Court's most closely watched case, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, because he had been a member of the D.C. Circuit panel that heard the case.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (2005).
201. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2653 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
1028 [Vol. 83:997
STYLE OF A SKEPTIC
Roberts's basic argument is that the majority has improperly rejected the District
Court's factual finding that the new District 25 satisfies the standards for a Latino
opportunity district:
Unable to escape the District Court's factfinding, the majority is left in the
awkward position of maintaining that its theory about compactness is more
important under § 2 than the actual prospects of electoral success for Latino-
preferred candidates under a State's apportionment plan. And that theory is a
novel one to boot. Never before has this or any other court struck down a
State's redistricting plan under § 2, on the ground that the plan achieves the
maximum number of possible majority-minority districts, but loses on style
points, in that the minority voters in one of those districts are not as "compact"
as the minority voters would be in another district were the lines differently
drawn.
202
Roberts returns to his favorite dichotomy of theory and fact, this time italicizing
"theory" to emphasize the weakness of a position founded exclusively on that basis.
The majority position is even weaker, he notes, because the theory is "a novel one
to boot," and to further underscore the point he adds a colloquial emphatic to the
typographic one. Finally, Roberts recasts the dichotomy as one between style and
substance. He insists that the only argument available to the majority is that,
although District 25 satisfies the legal standard, it "loses on style points" by failing
to produce a compact community of Latinos. The fundamental dispute between the
majority and the dissent therefore rests precisely on the nature of the Latino
majority in the new district. According to Kennedy, the grouping together of two
disparate Latino communities, separated by "enormous geographical distance" and
"disparate needs and interests," 20 3 violates the standard of compactness and thus is
"about more than 'style points."' 20 4 According to Roberts, however, statistical
analysis demonstrates that those communities would favor, and have the numbers
to elect, the same candidates. He is, however, particularly harsh in responding to
the majority view that the District Court relied on "the prohibited assumption" that
voters of the same race would necessarily think and vote alike:
20 5
It is important to be perfectly clear about the following, out of fairness to the
District Court if for no other reason: No one has made any "assumptions" about
how voters in District 25 will vote based on their ethnic background. Not the
District Court; not this dissent. There was a trial. At trials assumptions give
way to facts.20 6
The syntactical rhythm of two fragments followed by a four word sentence
hammers home the point that the majority is relying on theory while the dissent
sticks to facts.
202. Id. at 2653.
203. Id. at 2619 (majority opinion).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 2656 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
206. Id. at 2656-57.
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The opinion is a compendium of Roberts's favorite stylistic devices, all devoted
to a steady assault on the majority. He employs one of his unusual adverbs to reveal
that "[w]hat is blushingly ironic" in the Kennedy opinion is the fact that the
previous opportunity district "suffers from the same 'flaw' the majority ascribes to
District 25, except to a greater degree," the flaw being significant geographical
separation of two distinct minority communities. 20 7 The majority, he implies,
should be ashamed to make that argument. After spelling out the precise distances
involved, he concludes tartly by turning the majority's language against it in
another calculated syntactical fragment: "So much for the significance of
'enormous geographical distance."' 20 8 He finds a metaphor evocative of shame-
"[t]he majority's fig leaf"20--for its asserted reliance on both distance and lack of
common interests to distinguish the new district from the old. He also invokes
expert evidence relied on by the District Court to find that the new district "would
likely perform impeccably for Latino voters." 210 Finally, he confesses to
bewilderment at the majority's conclusion, since "[i]t baffles me how this could be
vote dilution, let alone how the District Court's contrary conclusion could be
clearly erroneous." 21 1 The passage combines a verb expressive more of sorrow than
anger with the emphasis of alliteration to support once again the blameless District
Court against the majority's unreasonable attack.
Roberts opens the second part of his opinion with another use of repetition: "The
majority arrives at the wrong resolution because it begins its analysis in the wrong
place." 212 The Court, Roberts insists, should focus not on District 25 in isolation,
but on the combined effect of all the districts in the relevant area of the state. Since
the new map contains the greatest possible number of majority-minority districts,
"the majority's intrusion into line-drawing ... suggests that all this is just so much
hollow rhetoric, '213 a phrase he has used before21 4 and uses here to distinguish once
again between theory and fact. The earlier tone of bafflement gives way to a
sharper sarcasm as Roberts turns his focus from the majority's lack of deference to
the lower court to the majority's lack of deference to the states. It is, he suggests,
improperly requiring Texas to draw a district containing a compact minority
population. That requirement is clearly misguided, since "Section 2 is, after all, part
of the Voting Rights Act, not the Compactness Rights Act.",215 He dismisses "[t]he
majority's squeamishness about the supposed challenge facing a Latino-preferred
candidate in District 25" as misplaced, since such a contest would be a routine "part
of a healthy political process." 216 The submerged physical metaphor-the majority
is too fastidious to appreciate the robust nature of that "healthy" process-
reinforces the idea that the Court is out of touch with the realities of the political
system. In a final jab, Roberts accuses the majority's demand for a compact and
207. Id. at 2657.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 2657 n.*.
210. Id. at 2658.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 2660.
214. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 353 (2006).
215. League of UnitedLatin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2660.
216. Id. at2661.
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unified Latino community of "giv[ing] an unfamiliar meaning to the word
'opportunity.' 21 7
In the final part of his opinion, Roberts argues that, under the new map, Latino
opportunity districts (six out of thirty-two districts, or nineteen percent) are
appropriately proportional to the Latino population of the state, which comprises
twenty-two percent of the total population. 21 8 He accuses the majority of distortion
by counting all Latino voters for purposes of tallying the total population while
excluding those Latino voters added to the new district for purposes of the
proportionality analysis. This, he suggests, is a deliberately misleading strategy:
"Heads the plaintiffs win; tails the State loses." 219 The familiar formula, the
paradigm of a crooked method of resolving a dispute, casts the majority as not only
misguided but also deliberately manipulative.
Roberts concludes his opinion by expanding the focus of his criticism from the
Texas redistricting map to the larger question of racial identity in the political
process. The passage is unusually striking in its language:
It is a sordid business, this divvying us up by race. When a State's plan already
provides the maximum possible number of majority-minority opportunity
districts, and the minority enjoys effective political power in the area well in
excess of its proportion of the population, I would conclude that the courts have
no further role to play in rejiggering the district lines under § 2.220
Although he has not argued in his opinion for the overruling of any of the Court's
cited precedents, he seems here to be rejecting the use of race in the redistricting
process. "Sordid" is a powerful word to attach, even by implication, to a Court
decision. The use of two highly colloquial terms, "divvying" and "rejiggering,"
suggests that the entire redistricting process is a political game rather than a
constitutionally necessary or even valid procedure. And the syntax of the first
sentence, itself rarely seen in legal prose, sounds an elegiac note. He has done his
best, Roberts suggests, to identify and correct the Court's specific errors, but to his
sorrow and regret the larger problem, the sordid business of race in politics,
remains.
CONCLUSION
After Chief Justice Roberts's first term on the Supreme Court, the familiar
elements of his judicial personality are at least provisionally in place. He continues
to write with skillfully crafted clarity to reach a lay as well as a legal audience. The
typical Roberts opinion contains a minimum of legal jargon and an absence of law
review citations, relying instead on an assortment of rhetorical strategies to engage
and persuade his readers.221 The voice is conversational, sometimes colloquial, in
217. Id.
218. Id. at 2662.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 2663 (emphasis in original).
221. Linda Greenhouse also notes these elements of Roberts's opinion style and ties it to
his years of private practice: "It is direct, straightforward, free of legal jargon, the voice of a
lawyer who made a living selling complicated ideas to busy appellate judges under tight time
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its diction and syntax. It uses conventional adages to reassure. Occasionally it uses
unconventional metaphors or analogies to startle; it may at times be playful in its
language or erudite in its allusions. The voice remains detached but genial, more
likely to profess itself baffled than angered by opposing views, although Roberts's
final dissent suggests that, when provoked, he is capable of a harsher response. It
is, in short, the voice of a usually good-humored, coolly rational judge who views
the task of decision making as rooted in human experience and largely explicable in
human terms.
Roberts's preference for grounding his legal conclusions in the realities of
experience reflects his broader preference for fact over theory, a position that has
led him to disavow any "overarching judicial philosophy" of his own.222 The
commonsensical tone of his opinions repeatedly insists that legal problems, even
problems of constitutional interpretation, can best be approached through an
understanding of how people or institutions behave under specific circumstances:
how, for example, a visitor to a shared dwelling decides whether to enter when one
resident refuses access or how likely a property owner is to receive a tax notice sent
by certified mail. Roberts's insistence on the particular rather than the general also
underlies his view of narrow decisions as a means of fostering consensus on the
Court, a connection he made clear in a recent speech: "Division should not be
artificially suppressed, but the rule of law benefits from a broader agreement. The
broader the agreement among the justices, the more likely it is a decision on the
narrowest possible grounds." 223 The new Chief Justice's goal for the Court and his
preferred approach to decision making suggest that his future opinions may well
continue to be focused on factual context rather than on expansive theories.224
There is one further, though more tentative, aspect of Roberts's judicial
personality that may have important implications for the development of his
jurisprudence: his location of himself as the heir to a line of distinguished judges-
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Learned Hand, Henry Friendly-who, among them,
represent traditions of skepticism, judicial restraint, and legal craftsmanship. In his
opening statement at his confirmation hearing, Roberts observed that "[m]y
constraints." Greenhouse, supra note 158, at 5.
222. In response to a question from Senator Schumer, Roberts made a similar point in
defending his judicial record: "I don't think you can read these opinions and say that these
are the opinions of an ideologue.... But I think if you look at what I've done since I took
the judicial oath, that should convince you that I'm not an ideologue. And you and I agree
that that's not the sort of person we want on the Supreme Court." Confirmation Hearing,
supra note 40, at 27. In an exchange with Senator Hatch, Roberts was even more explicit:
"Well, I have said I do not have an overarching judicial philosophy that I bring to every case.
And I think that's true. I tend to look at cases from the bottom up rather than the top down
and, like I think all good judges, focus a lot on the facts." Id. at 159.
223. The speech was his commencement address at Georgetown University's law school.
Chief Justice Says His Goal Is More Consensus on Court, supra note 71, at A16.
224. At his confirmation hearing, Roberts emphasized the value of consensus: "I do think
the Chief Justice has a particular obligation to try to achieve consensus consistent with
everyone's individual oath to uphold the Constitution, and that would certainly be a priority
for me if I were confirmed." Confirmation Hearing, supra note 40, at 303. The concern for
consensus based on narrowly-drawn opinions might also contribute to another of Roberts's
stated goals for the Court, the expansion of its docket. He testified that the Court currently
hears half the cases it heard twenty years ago and added, "I think the capability to address
more issues is there in the court." Id. at 309.
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personal appreciation that I owe a great deal to others reinforces my view that a
certain humility should characterize the judicial role." 225 And, in a recent interview,
he added another judicial figure to his pantheon, John Marshall, the Chief Justice
whom he hopes to emulate in leading a unified Court that will relinquish "the
personalization of judicial politics" and "the jurisprudence of the individual" in
favor of "a jurisprudence of the Court." 226 These comments, like the rhetoric of his
opinions, suggest that there are jurisprudential values he places above ideological
purity.227 They suggest as well that, in performing his dual roles of opinion writer
and Chief Justice, Roberts may prove to be that rara avis on the Supreme Court
bench, both an artful voice of judicial skepticism and a forger ofjudicial consensus.
The recent end of Roberts's second Court term, one that produced a number of
controversial cases, suggests a somewhat different picture. In a series of high-
profile decisions involving such divisive issues as abortion, 228 the First
Amendment, 229 and the use of race in pupil assignment policies, 230 Roberts joined
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito in upholding conservative positions.
Those decisions tended to undermine, though not expressly overrule, Court
precedents. In Gonzales v. Carhart,231for example, the majority upheld the federal
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban without reversing Stenberg v. Carhart,232 which struck
225. Confirmation Hearing, supra note 40, at 55. At his confirmation hearing Roberts
also described himself as "a modest judge":
Like most people, I resist the labels. I have told people, when pressed, that I
prefer to be known as a modest judge. And to me that means some of the things
you talked about in those other labels. It means an appreciation that the role of a
judge is limited; that a judge is to decide cases before them; they're not to
legislate, they're not to execute the laws.
Id. at 158.
226. Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts's Rules, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2007, at 104, 106
(quoting John Roberts).
227. Rosen states,
Roberts praised justices who were willing to put the good of the Court above
their own ideological agendas. "A justice is not like a law professor, who might
say, 'This is my theory... and this is what I'm going to be faithful to and
consistent with'...." Instead of nine justices moving in nine separate
directions, Roberts said, "it would be good to have a commitment on the part of
the Court to acting as a Court, rather than being more concerned about the
consistency and coherency of an individual judicial record."
Id.
228. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (upholding the federal Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003).
229. See FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007) (holding application of
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act to issue-advocacy ads a violation of First Amendment free
speech rights); Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (finding no violation of student's
First Amendment free speech rights in high school principal's confiscation of banner that
could reasonably be read as advocating drug use).
230. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738
(2007) (finding pupil assignment plans relying on racial classifications an equal protection
violation).
231. 1275 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
232. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
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233down a comparable Nebraska statute. And Roberts's own positions were
sometimes even more nuanced than the Court's holdings. In Gonzales, he did not
join the Thomas concurrence declaring the Court's major abortion precedents
unconstitutional, 234 and, in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation,235 he joined
the majority opinion dismissing the case on standing grounds under Flast v.
Cohen236 but declined to join Scalia's concurrence calling for Flast's reversal.237
Such refinements led Scalia to denounce what he called "faux judicial restraint" 238
and caused Jeffrey Toobin, in his recent study of the Court, to charge that "Roberts
had engaged in the pretense of minimalism-that is, of respecting the Court's
precedents-without actually doing so., 239 In the term's most prominent case,
Roberts chose to write for the Court in striking down pupil assignment policies that
used racial classifications, ending his opinion with a characteristically artful
repetition: "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race." 240 Yet he also chose to invoke both of the
Court's opinions in Brown v. Board of Education241 as authority for his position,
seeming at once to honor and reinterpret those iconic cases.
242
What should we make of all this? Is Roberts, as Toobin argues, driven
exclusively by his ideological convictions in spite of his public embrace of
consensus and judicial minimalism as his goals for the Court?243 Or should his
nuanced positions be read as the early efforts of a conservative Justice who
recognizes such non-ideological constraints as stare decisis and the institutional
claims of the Court on his jurisprudence? Two terms provide insufficient evidence
to answer such questions, just as they provide insufficient time for a new Justice to
emerge with clarity. As Roberts himself might say, reaching for one of the homely
adages he favors to underscore a point, the proof will be in the pudding.
233. Id.
234. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1639. Only Scalia joined the concurrence. Id.
235. 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
236. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
237. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2584 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Only Thomas joined
the concurrence. Id.
238. FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2864 n.7 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and in judgment).
239. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 332
(2007). Scalia offered a more acerbic critique of the majority's refusal to strike down Flast:
"Minimalism is an admirable judicial trait, but not when it comes at the cost of meaningless
and disingenuous distinctions that hold the sure promise of engendering further meaningless
and disingenuous distinctions in the future." Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2582 (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment).
240. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768
(2007). Justice Kennedy did not join the section of the opinion, rendering it a plurality view.
Id. at 2788.
241. 346 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I); 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II).
242. Parents Involved in Community Schools, 127 S. Ct. at 2767-68.
243. TOOBIN, supra note 239, at 338-39.
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